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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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Drfe1111rmts, 
and 
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Defe11da11t aj/(l Appclla11t. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THJ<J CASE 
The purpose of this case is to determine wh0ther or 
not a fiv0-year written lease b0tween a contract pur-
l'haspr as lessor and his lessee is binding upon the con-
tl'nd sdlc>r after the contract purchaser's interest in the 
rral estate has hec>n terminated b~· a Court decr0e. 
DIRPOSTTIO~ TN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court by dc>eree datPcl Jmrnar~- 13, 1961, 
!l'rmiuntPd the intPrest of the contract purchasers, .Joy 
l 
R. Berry, et ux, and 011 l\fareh 30, 1967, hy Summar)· 
Judgment determined that a lease between the eoutrart 
purchaser and a lessee was not binding upon the ron. 
tract seller and terminated the lessee> 's right to posseR-
sion. The Appeal involves only the Judgm<:>nt of Marrh 
30, 1967. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks to reverse the .Judgment 
of the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 20, 1965, the Plaintiff-Respondents, here-
inafter ref erred to as Evershed, owned eertain real c;;-
tate in Murray, Utah, and sold sueh real estate to .To)· 
R. Berry, (>t ux, under the terms of a Real Estate Con-
tract (Exhibit P-1). 
On October 20, 1965, the contract, which contained a 
provision to the effect that no assignment or transfer of 
an interest in the property would be valid unless made 
with the written consent of Evershed, the seller, was 
recorded in the County Recorder's Office of Salt Lake 
County, Utah (Exhibit P-1). 
On July 2, 1966, Joy R. Berry entered into a written 
five-year lease agreement with the Defendant-Appellant, 
Phillip Conley, hereinafter referred to as Conley, eoYcr-
ing a part only of the premises being purchase<l frorn 
Evershed ( R-27). 
Evershed had no knowledge of the terms or rou-
clitions of the lease (R-44). 
2 
'l'hP contract purchasers, .Joy R. Berry, et nx, de-
faul!('rl and their interest in a!l(l to the real estate and 
possession thereof was terminated (Findings of Fact, 
( 
1onclusions of Law and Judgment, R-20-21, 22, 23 
and 2-1-). 
On December 14th and 15th, 1966, Conley and Berry 
wrr0 served with the Complaint and Summons (R-16 
a 1111 18). 
Tlwre arc no writings or memoranda of any agree-
ml'nt between Evershed and Conley. (R-31, 44 and 45.) 
ARGUMENT 
Conley's only contention is that he has a valid arnl 
rxisting five-year lease dated July 2, 1966. (R-25 and 
Appellant's Brief page 4) 
It is admitted that the lease is Yalid as between Con-
k·»-1essee and Berry-lessor, as the parties thereto. 
'l'he onl~· question to bP determined is whether the 
l!·ase is binding upon Evrrshed who \ms not a party 
tlJPreto. 
The real estate contract was placed of record \\·ith 
t!Jp Count~- Recorder (Exhibit P-1) and thereby con-
st ructin' notice was given to all persons that no interest 
i11 the property conld he obtained without the written 
r·o11,.;011t of F,,·ershed. 
:~ 
POINT 1 
LESSEE'S INTERES'l' TERl\IIN ATED WHEX 
HIS LESSOR'S INTEREST WAS TERMI-
NATED. 
It is fundamental that a lessee obtains 110 greater 
rights in the leased premises than those of the lessor. 
"93. TERMINATION OF LANDLORD'S ESTATE ... As 
a general rule a lesse0 is terminated hy the expira-
tion of the lessor's estate, and no 11otire, wriitrn 
or otherwise, is necessary to bring about surh 
termination .... '' 51 CJS, Sec. 93. 
And, as stated by Justice Field of the U. S. Snprernr 
Court, in the case of Deseret 8alt Company v. Tarpr11. 
142 U.S. 241, 35 Law Edition 199 (Appeal from Utah 
Territon' Court). 
'' ... The lessee ran, of course, as agai118t a 
stranger have no greater right of possession than 
his lessor ... '' Page 244. 
Since the lessor's interests (Berry, et ux) were ter-
minated by a judicial derrec which is final and from 
which there is no appeal, it is necessary for the les~ee 
(Conley) to offer material facts tending to prove alleg-n-
tions setting forth an agreement between Evershed aJlll 
Conley. 
POINT 2 
A FIVE-YEAR LEASE IS NOT VALID 
AGAINST THE PROPERTY OWNER UN-
LESS IT IS BASED ON WRITTEN MEMO-
RANDUM SIGNED BY THE PROPJ@TY 
OWNER. 
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Conley makes no claim as to the existence of any 
\\Titings or memoranda reflecting an agT0ement hetw0en 
Conley a11il Evers!Jed. Conley's only claim as to any 
eonnrsation with En~rshed refers to a conversation 
orruning after Conley had heen ser\'ed with a Complaint 
],~, En'rshl'd naming Conle>' as a Defendant and seeking 
a Court adjudication terminating all adverse interP8ts 
in the rl'al <'state (R-14, R-31). 
Fnder the Statute of Frauds, no ll'ase or contract 
for an intel'est in land is \'alid unless it i8 in writing and 
>11hscrilwc1 hy the Lessor. 
'' 25-5-3. LEASES AND CONTRACTS FOR INTERESTS IN 
LANDS. Every contract for the leasing for a lon-
ger period than one year, or for the sale of any 
lan<ls, or an>' intf•rest in lands, shall be void unless 
the contract or some note or memorandum thereof, 
is in writing subscribed by the party by whom 
the lease or sale is to he ma<le, or by his lawful 
agPnt thereunto authorized in writing." (Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.) (Statute of 
Frauds.) 
Further all agreements which by their terms cannot 
lie pel'forml'd within one year are void unless in writing 
H1hscrihed hy thr party to be charged. 
"25-5-1. CERTAIN AGREEMENTS Vorn UNLESS WRIT-
TEN A ND SUBSCRIBED - In the following cases ev-
er:v agreement shall bl' \'oid unless such agree-
ment or some note or memorandum thereof, is in 
writing subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not 
to he pl'rfol'med within one year from the making 
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thereof ... " (Utah Code Annotated, 1933, 11, 
amended.) (Sta tnte of Frauds.) 
A parol lease of property for more than one year i.' 
of no force and effect whatever aR inclicatNl in the la11rl-
mark case of Utah 07)firal Company, •. Krith, Fehrnar;-
23, 1899, 18 U. 464, 56 P. 155. 
" ... The alleged lease. being hy parol for two 
~rears, ·was void, under the statute of frauds, and 
therefore had no force or effect whatever. It 
passed no leasehold estate. The relation of land-
lord and tenant could not he creat0d by, or ron-
timwd under it ... " Page 157. 
Conley makes no claim that the terms and conclitiom 
of a lease ag-rrement were known to Evershed prior to 
the time that the lease was filed as an exhil1it to an affi-
davit in this action, or that the terms and conditions of 
a lease were discussed. 
It is axiomatic that until the parties ha-\·e discnssrd 
and agreed upon the terms there cannot he an pnforce-
ahle contract. This rule of law is espoused in Campbell 
v. Nelson, April, 1942, 102 Utah 78, 125 Pac. 2d 413: 
" ... 'Every contract for the leasing· for a longrr 
period than· one year, or for the sale~ of any lands. 
or any interests in lands, shall be void unless tl1r 
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof. 
is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the 
10ase or sale is to he made, or hy his lawfnl agPnt 
therennto authorize<l in writing.' 
"The terms of the contract in the prcsrnt 
case "·ere indefinite. An oral contract for thr 
purchase of real propert~· muRt he suffiricntl:r 
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<1rfi11ite and rertain so that it can he enforced bv 
the court. Until the parties have agreed as to th.e 
terms there is not an enforceable contract in fact, 
and partial performance cannot make up for the 
ck•ficiency in the nnderstandilng between the par-
ties ... " Page 415. 
The rules set forth in the above cases were reviewed 
and reaffirmed in the casP of Rirdzell v. Utah Oil Refin-
i11g ro., April, 1952, 121 U. 412, 242 P. 2nd 578, page 580. 
'' ... In an oral contract to execute a lease for a 
period longer than one year, the amount of the 
rPnt is clearly one of the essential terms which 
must appear in a memorandum ... 'It may be 
stated as settled law that a memorandum of 
agreement for a lease which is required to be in 
writing, in order to satisfy the statute of frauds, 
must contain all the essential and material parts 
of the lease which is to be executed thereafter ac-
cording to its terms, and particularly must con-
tain three essentials in order to (sic) its validity 
under the statute of frauds. These are: First, a 
definite agreement as to the extent and boundary 
of the property to be leased; second, a definite 
and agreed term; and third, a definite and agreed 
rental and the time and manner of its pay-
ment ... '" 
POINT 3 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER FOR 
THERE ARE NO CONTESTED ISSUES OF 
FACT THAT WOULD HAVE A MATERIAL 
BEARING ON THIS CASE. 
The Plaintiff, Evershed, agrees with the law affect-
ing Summary Judgments as cited by the Defendant Con-
ley. Evrrshed does not agree that those certain items 
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listed in thr paragTaphs lettered "a" t hrnng·h "l'" i11 
C'onlp:-'s Brirf <'Onstitute materinl, admissible fads. 'l'li1· 
elnims rontained in thr ldtered paragrnphs an• h1•r1·-
aftc>r eonsicl0rr(l in idrntieall:--lrttPn•d pnragTaphs. 
a. It rerp1ires thP applieatio11 of the law to thP fad, 
to detrrmine wht>thrr or not a n1licl lt>asP Pxistr1l lwhrP1·11 
Conlr>- and Enrshc•d. It is admittP<l that a Yalicl le:t;,1· 
PxistPcl brtwPPn the signatoriPs of that leasr to-wit: 
Bt>rr>·· Lessor, aml Conle:-, Lt>ssee. 1'ht> elaim that tlir 
fh-r-:·ear \\Tittrn leasr hehYPPn C'onlr:- arnl Beny hiniJ, 
E\·ershe<l is a quest ion of la"· arn1 thr fads prPsc•ntr·il 
to support thL• samr must he aclmissihh· nrnkr th<' ;;t:it11l1 
of framls. Xo snch aclmissihlr matc•rial facts lrnn- h<'!'li 
Jll'O]lOSeCT ! 
h. It is claimed that Ewrsht>cl ratifircl thr Co11l 1·\--
Brrn- lt>ase h>· arcc•pting Conlr:· 011 the propc1 rf>·· Till' 
occ11pm1e:· of tlw pro11erty hy Con]p>· is aclmittP<l :1~ :m· 
the cireumstanet>s mi<lt>r which lw aeq11ir0d possPssi011. 
1'h0 clt>tPrmination as to whrtl10r s11eh oceupancy c011,li-
t11tt>d ratification or acloption of tlH· Co11l0:·-Rprr\· lf'<l''' 
h:· E\·prshecl is n question of law all<l not a q11Pstio1 1 
of fad. 
The Court's att0ntion is again <lrnw11 to thr fact fh:1t 
t ]ip 1 rrms a 11cl co11di tions of the Bc•rry-Con le:· lease " 1·n· 
not known to EYrrshecl at thr t irne possrssion "·as oli-
t:ii11rd l):· C011l0:·. 
c. Tn the rmragTaph numht•l'(•tl "c" of Conlc·:-"s Jiril'i'. 
it is elaimecl that C01il0:· is n !Prnrnt from Yl'<H to n:ii. 
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11hid1 claim is completely colltrary to Conle~''s claim 
in his Answer (R-25) or his Brief in the second para-
~rilph of Point 1 on page 4, wherein he claims a 
tin'-)·ear written lease. There is no offer to prove a year 
tn )'rar lPase in either the pleadings or the Affidavit of 
the D0fendant, Conley. This contention is first made in 
(]w f.lupreme Court of the Atate of Utah. 
d. Since an act does not constitute a written memo-
randum signed by the Lessor, the acts of the Plaintiff 
:ire wholly immaterial. Nevertheless, such acts as may 
he set forth by Conley are admitted by Evershed and the 
tlispute is as to the legal consequence of these acts. 
· e. Conley claims that the suit was not based on his 
llcfanlt. This claim is true. The suit is based on Ever-
~hcrl 's right to possession of the property as owner and 
<ls a result of Berry's default in the performance of the 
conditions of the Real Estate Purchase Contract. 
Although the law cited by Conley in relation to Sum-
mary Judgment is correct the Summary Judgment in this 
rase should he sustained for there is no material fact 
allrged or proposed ·which ·would affect the application of 
the legal principles that is not admitted. 
Conley could have determined whether his lease 
liouncl Evershed by submitting such lease to Evershed 
hefore its execution, and asking Evershed 's acceptance 
thereof or subordination thereto and his improvidence 
'l1oulcl not result in damage to Evershed who was not a 
party to the transaction. 
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Co11le.'· may well han" a claim for br<'ach of hi:-; rigl1t 
of pos:-;ession against Reny as lessor, hut thPr0 is 110 
n•ason to ,·isit upo11 the owner:-; of the prnperty the lia-
l iii i ties and damag0s r0sulting from t Ju• lessor':-; fa ihm· 
to maintnin his purchase contract or tl1<' les:-;pe ':-; failnn· 
to obtain co11:-;011t to the l0asc from the mn1ns. 
CONCLUSION 
All rights of lessor, Berry, were terminated h)· Court 
decr0e; and, therefore, it is necessary for Conle.'', the 
Appellant, to allege a relationship betwee11 001iley n11d 
En,rsh0cl. TlH•re are no such allegations. 
Si11ce a lease for a pPriod i11 excNrn of om' year j,; 
Yoid unless supported h.'· 'uittPn nwmoranda signe(l h>-
the part.'· he eharged, it is incumhPnt upon Conle.'· to 
claim the existence of such memoranda and hc> Jrn;.; failed 
to make such claim. 
There is no issue of faet that "·ould hm·e a mate-
rial bearing on this case. Tlw Di,.;trirt Court was ('01'-
rrct in granting Juc1gnwnt and sneh Judgment should lw 
sustained. 
Rrspertfull:· submitted, 
BIELE, .TONES & MURPHY 
117 East 4th South Strec't 
Attor11e11s for P!aiilfltfs 
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